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Abstract
We introduce a description of the power structure which is inherent in a strate-
gic game form using the concept of an interaction sheaf. The latter assigns to
each open set of outcomes a set of interaction arrays, specifying the changes that
coalitions can make if outcome belongs to this open set. The interaction sheaf
generalizes the notion of effectivity functions which has been widely used in im-
plementation theory, taking into consideration that changes in outcome may be
sustained not only by single coalitions but possibly by several coalitions, depend-
ing on the underlying strategy choices. Also, it allows us to consider game forms
with not necessarily finite sets of outcomes, generalizing the results on solvability
of game forms obtained in the finite case in Abdou and Keiding (2003).
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1 Introduction
A game form is strongly solvable if for each assignment of individual preferences
over outcomes, the resulting game possesses a strong Nash equilibrium. Several
necessary conditions for strong solvability can be found in the literature; Abdou
and Keiding (2003) provide conditions which are both necesssary and sufficient,
at least for the case where the strategy sets of the game form are all finite. In
this paper we present a model of interaction based on power distribution among
agents, a model general enough to allow for a representation of classical coalitional
models (e.g. effectivity functions) as well as to capture the essential features of
strategic ones (e.g. game forms). For this, use an extension of the well-known
concept of an effectivity function associated with a game form introduced by
Moulin and Peleg (1982) and the property of acyclicity of this extended effectiv-
ity function, also known from the implementation literature, cf. e.g. Abdou and
Keiding (1991). This extension is done in such a way that the essential inter-
action inherent in a strategic game form can be represented in the new object.
An interaction sheaf is to the notion of equilibrium ( e.g. Nash or strong Nash)
precisely what the effectivity function is to the core.
In this paper, a game form is said to be M-solvable (where M is any col-
lection of coalitions) if it has M-equilibria for any assignment of preferences.
Nash solvability and strong Nash solvability are special cases of M-solvability.
We extend the characterization of M-solvable game forms to the case where the
game form may have infinitely many strategies and alternatives, so that strategy
sets and outcome space are topological spaces, assumed in general to be compact
Hausdorff spaces. In this setup, the notion of an outcome-dependent effectivity
function ,which is at the basis of the characterization of solvability, is naturally
formalized using the concept of a sheaf, which captures the idea of local (outcome-
dependent) power of coalitions by specifying the power structure valid at each
open set of outcomes. It turns out that the right concept in this setting is the
interaction sheaf associated with a game form. Furthermore the notion of an ab-
stract interaction sheaf is introduced and the corresponding notion of settlement
set and stability.
An interaction sheaf is an object which is similar to that of an effectivity
structure as introduced by Abdou and Keiding (2003), with the difference that
it can be used in the context of outcome spaces that are not necessarily finite.
The advantages of the present way of formalizing power structures are that (1)
it allows for the representation of various equilibrium concepts within the same
interaction form, whereas the other is specific to one equilibrium concept, and
(2) in the current model, it allows for operations like projections that faithfully
reflect the change in the underlying confederation, and most importantly, (3) since
only the interactive form associated to some game form and some equilibrium
concept is relevant for stability, it allows for a simple comparison between different
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procedures or mechanisms with respect to stability. An interaction form can thus
be viewed as an intrinsic representation of power without a direct reference to
strategies or to some equilibrium concept.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we give the definitions of the
basic concepts such as game forms, preferences, equilibria, and in Section 3, we
proceed to the concepts which are central for the following, namely interaction
sheaves. In this section, we also investigate some general properties of interaction
sheaves, and we introduce the notion of a settlement as well as stability of inter-
action sheaves. The next section is concerned with the characterization of stable
interaction sheaves by the property of acyclicity, thus extending a result known
from simple games (Nakamura (1979)) and effectivity functions (Keiding (1985)
to the present general context of interaction sheaves. Section 5 contains the main
result of the paper, showing that solvability of game forms may be character-
ized in terms of stability or acyclicity of the associated interaction sheaf. The
concluding section contains some final comments.
2 Basic definitions and notations
In the present section, we introduce the concepts and the notation which will be
needed as we proceed. We use of the following notational conventions: For any
set D, we denote by P(D) the set of all subsets of D and by P0(D) = P(D)\{∅}
the set of all non-empty subsets of D. Elements of P(N) are called coalitions,
and a confederation is a subset M of P0(N).
A game form is an array G = (X1, · · · , Xn, A, g). Here the set N = {1, · · · , n},
where n ≥ 2, is interpreted as the set of players, Xi is the strategy set of player
i, for i ∈ N , A is the set of alternatives, and g : ∏i∈N Xi −→ A is the outcome
function. For every coalition S ∈ P0(N), the product ∏i∈S Xi is denoted XS
(by convention X∅ is the singleton {∅}) and N\S is denoted Sc. Similarly if
B ∈ P(A), A\B is denoted Bc. If xN ∈ XN , the notation g(xS, XSc) stands for
{g(xS, ySc) | ySc ∈ XSc} if S 6= ∅ and for g(XN) if S = ∅.
For any set D, Q(D) denotes the set of all quasi-orders on D (that is all binary
relations on D which are complete and transitive). We let
◦
R denote the strict
preference relation associated with R, that is a
◦
R b if and only if a R b and not
b R a.
We assume that X1, · · · , Xn and A are Hausdorff compact topological spaces
and that g is continous and onto. We denote by G the set of open sets of A, by
F that of closed sets. Moreover G0 ≡ G \ {∅} and F0 ≡ F \ {∅}. A quasi-order R
on A is continuous if for any a ∈ A the sets {b ∈ A | b R a} and {b ∈ A | a R b}
are closed. A continuous real function u induces a continuous quasi-order R by
setting a R b if and only if u(a) ≥ u(b).
A game in strategic form is an array (X1, . . . , Xn;Q1, . . . , Qn), where for each
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i ∈ N =, Xi is the set of strategies of player i, and Qi is a quasi-order on
XN =
∏
i∈N Xi. For M a confederation , a strategy array xN ∈ XN is an M-
equilibrium of the game (X1, . . . , Xn;Q1, . . . , Qn) if there is no coalition S ∈ M
and yS ∈ XS such that for all i ∈ S:
(yS, xSc)
◦
QixN .
For R ∈ Q(A) we put P (a,R) = {b ∈ A | b ◦R a }. A preference profile (over
A) is a map RN from N to Q(A), also written as RN = (R1, . . . , RN), so that a
preference profile is an element of Q(A)N . For notational convention, we write
P (a, i, RN) for P (a,Ri), and we use the notations P (a, S,RN) = ∩i∈SP (a, i, RN)
for S ∈ P0(N). For each preference profile RN ∈ Q(A), the game form G induces
a game (X1, . . . , Xn;Q1, . . . , Qn) with the same strategy spaces as in G and with
the Qi defined by
xN Qi yN ⇔ g(xN)Ri g(yN)
for xN , yN ∈ XN . We denote this game by (G,RN)
We say that a ∈ A is an M-equilibrium outcome of (G,RN) if there exists
an M- equilibrium xN in (G,RN) such that g(xN) = a. Let L ⊂ Q(A) be a
subset of preferences. The game form G is said to be solvable inM-equilibrium
or M-solvable on L if for each preference profile RN ∈ LN , the game (G,RN)
has a strong equilibrium. In particular, when M = N = {{1}, . . . , {n}}, the set
of all singleton coalitions, then an M-equilibrium is simply a Nash equilibrium.
Similarly, when M = P0(N), the family of all coalitions, an M-equilibrium is a
strong Nash equilibrium.
3 Interaction sheaves
In this paper, we aim at a characterization of M-solvable game forms using a
suitable notion of power structure which is inherent in the game form. This
approach was initiated by the seminal paper by Moulin and Peleg (1984), where
they introduced the effectivity function associated with a game form. For the
solvability of game forms, the effectivity function contains too little information,
and refined notions of power structures were considered by Abdou and Keiding
(2003) in the context of solvability of game forms with finite strategy spaces.
Below we introduce a generalization of effectivity functions that will work in the
context of solvability of game forms with an infinite number of strategies.
Definition 3.1 (a) An interaction array on (N,A) is a map ϕ : P0(N)→ P(A)
with ϕ(S) 6= ∅ for some S ∈ P0(N). Let P0(N,A) be the set of all interaction
arrays. We introduce a partial order ≤ on P0(N,A) by the formula ϕ ≤ ψ if and
only if ϕ(S) ⊂ ψ(S) for all S ∈ P0(N). For A ⊂ P(A). We denote by A0(N,A)
the set of all interaction arrays with values in A.
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(b) An interaction form with values in A is a mapping E : G0 → A0(N,A) such
that for all U ∈ G0, ϕ, ψ ∈ A0(N,A), if ϕ ∈ E [U ] and ϕ ≤ ψ then ψ ∈ E [U ]
(d) The interaction form E is a an interaction presheaf if U ⊂ V ⇒ E [V ] ⊂ E [U ]
for all U, V ∈ G0, and an interaction sheaf if, in addition, for each U ∈ G0 and
each open covering (Ui)i∈I of U one has E [U ] = ∩i∈IE [Ui].
Interaction forms are collections of interaction arrays that satisfy natural con-
ditions of non-trivialness and monotonicity, and they can be considered as a
formalization of the power structure in society. Part (c) of the definition con-
nects the power structure of the interaction form to the topology of the outcome
space.
When E is a presheaf, we may think of an interaction array in E [U ] as a
description of an availlable move of the agents given any state in U . Let M ⊂
P0(N) be a confederation. In order that a scenario leading to some outcome be
viable, it needs to be appoved by all coalitions of M. To interpret the statement
ϕ ∈ E [U ], one may imagine that any outcome in U can occur in different scenarios
that are not directly explicited in the model; any scenario leading to some state
in U may arouse some coalition S ∈ M that objects by threatening to drive
the outcome into ϕ(S), in this case a is rejected. The interaction array is the
result of a disjunctive move of the coalitions, so that the surge of some objecting
coalition S is not concomitant to that of another coalition. Within a coalition,
action is coordinated, not within a confederation. When a confederation becomes
active at a, this activation must be understood as a collusion of interests between
its components. Indeed the rejection of a is equivalent to the rejection of each
scenario leading to a, and each scenario may be opposed by some coalition in
M. Our model is universal in the sense that we allow a priori all coalitions
to react to some state in U . Nevertheless, the fact that ϕ(S) = ∅ for some S
means that coalition S is inhibited or desactivated and therefore that the power
represented by ϕ holds without the participation of S. Therefore the support
of ϕ (i.e. those coalitions S such that ϕ(S) is nonempty) is in fact the active
confederation behind ϕ.
Remark 3.2 The discussion of the present section has been confined to situ-
ations where the coalition structure is P0(N), the set of all nonempty subsets
of N . However, restricting to any M ⊂ P0(N) means simply that we consider
only interaction arrays which are projections ϕ|M to M of interaction arrays
ϕ ∈ P0(N,A), where
ϕ|M(S) =
{
ϕ(S) if S ∈M,
∅ otherwise.
E|M[U ] = {ϕ ∈ A0(N,A) | ϕ|M(S) ∈ E [U ]} (1)
It turns out ( See Proposition 5.2 and the related remark 5.1) that this restriction
reflects faithfully what is meant when the coalitions that are allowed to act jointly
are those members of the confederation M.
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As a first example of an interaction form, we consider the one induced by
an effectivity function E, that is a map E : P0(N) → P(P0(A)). To define the
interaction form EE associated with E we let EE[U ], for U ∈ G0, contain all the
interaction arrays ϕ such that δ(S,B) ≤ ϕ where
δ(S,B)(S
′) =
{
B if S ′ = S,
∅ otherwise.
This is an interaction sheaf, which is constant in the sense that EE[U ] does not
depend on U . Similarly, given an interaction form E one can extract an effectivity
functions EE with
EE(S) = {B ∈ P0(A) | δ(S,B) ∈ E [A]}.
For a more interesting interaction form, consider a game form G = (X1, . . . , Xn,
A, g) andM⊂ P0(N). The β-interaction form associated with (G,M) is defined
as
EG,Mβ [U ] = {ϕ ∈ P0(N,A) | ∀xN ∈ g−1(U),
∃S ∈M,∃yS ∈ XS : g(yS, xSc) ∈ ϕ(S)} (2)
for all U ∈ G0. This is actually an interaction sheaf. As is usual, the β-
construction shows what coalitions can do by adapting their coordinated strategy
choices to the situation, the latter represented by a strategy array with outcome
in U . There is a corresponding α-construction: Define the α-interaction form
associated with G and M by:
EG,Mα [U ] = {ϕ ∈ P0(N,A) | ∃xN ∈ g−1(U),
∀S ∈M,∀yS ∈ XS : g(yS, xSc) ∈ ϕ(S)} (3)
The α-interaction form is in general not a sheaf nor even a presheaf. It assigns to
any open set the interaction arrays which specify for each coalition S a set of out-
comes, namely ϕ(S) that Sc can force, given some fixed strategy array. In Section
5 we study interaction forms associated with continuous game forms. Whether
coalitions in the confederation have a real interest to dismantle an outcome a,
depends on the actual preferences. This is why we introduce the following:
Definition 3.3 Let E be an interaction presheaf, and let RN ∈ Q(A)N be a
preference profile. The alternative a ∈ A is dominated in E at RN if there is
an open neighbourhood U of a, an interaction array ϕ ∈ E [U ] such that for all
S ∈ P0(N), ϕ(S) ⊂ P (a, S,RN).
A settlement (for E at RN) is an alternative which is not dominated at RN ;
the set of all settlements is denoted Stl(E , RN). For L, a set of preferences, the
interaction presheaf E is stable on L if Stl(E , RN) is nonempty for all profiles
RN ∈ LN .
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An outcome a is a settlement if there exists at least one scenario that forces a
such that and no coalition has an incentive to disrupt it.
In the next section, we shall consider combinatorial conditions on the interac-
tion presheaf E which implies that it is stable. In the remainder of this section,
we shall have a closer look at the topological properties of E .
First of all we notice that there is a quasi-order ⊂ defined on interaction
presheaves by
E ⊂ E ′ if and only if E [U ] ⊂ E ′[U ] for all U ∈ G0.
Since the intersection of any family of interaction presheaves (sheaves) over A
is an interaction presheaf (sheaf), and since the trivial sheaf defined by E ′[U =
A0(N,A) for all U ∈ G0 contains all presheaves, it follows that for any interaction
presheaf E , there is a minimal (for ⊂) interaction sheaf (called the sheaf cover of
E and denoted E+) containing E , whereby for any U ∈ G, E+[U ] is defined as the
intersection of all E ′[U ] with E ′ ⊃ E .
Proposition 3.4 Let E be an interaction presheaf with values in A and for each
open set U , let R(U) be the set of all open coverings of U . Then
E+[U ] = ⋃
R∈R(U)
⋂
V ∈R
E [V ] (4)
and Stl(E , RN) = Stl(E+, RN) for any profile RN .
Proof: Let E ′[U ] denote the expression on the right hand of (4), then it is
staightforward that E ′ is a sheaf. Moreover for U open, E [U ] ⊂ E ′[U ] trivially,
since U is itself a covering of U , so E+[U ] ⊂ E ′[U ]. It follows that E+ ⊂ E ′.
Conversely if E ′′ is a sheaf such that E” ⊃ E , then it is easy to see that E ′′ ⊃ E ′.
It follows that E+ ⊃ E ′. The second statement follows from the definition of
domination.
Our definition of an interaction form, designed so as to capture the phe-
nomenon of state-dependent power structure, has taken as primitive notion of
local power the interaction arrays corresponding to the open neighbourhoods of
the topology, corresponding to the classical notion of a presheaf (cf. eg. Bredon,
1990). Alternatively, we might have considered local power as defined for each
point of A (corresponding to studying the sections of a presheaf). Below, we
consider such an alternative approach.
Definition 3.5 An interaction bundle with values in A is a map I : A →
A0(N,A). The alternative a ∈ A is dominated in I at the profile RN ∈ Q(A)N if
there exists ϕ ∈ I[a] such that for all S ∈ P0(N): ϕ(S) ⊂ P (a, S,RN). The set
Stl(I, RN) of settlements for I at RN consists of all the alternatives which are
not dominated in I at RN .
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It turns out that the β-interaction bundle associated with a game form is related
in a straightforward manner to the question of existence of equilibria of that game
form (Proposition 5.2). On the other hand the relation between acyclicity and
stability is easier to express using interaction presheaves (Theorem 4.4) We now
explore the interrelations between the two objects. To every interaction presheaf
E we associate the interaction bundle E• defined by
E•[a] = ⋃
U∈U(a)
E [U ],
where U(a) is the set of all open neighbourhoods of a. The following proposition
is obvious.
Proposition 3.6 Let E be an interaction presheaf. Then for any preference pro-
file RN ∈ Q(A)N , Stl(E , RN) = Stl(E•, RN).
Conversely, to any interaction bundle I we may associate an interaction sheaf
I defined by
I[U ] = ⋂
a∈U
I[a]
for any U ∈ G. The question whether any sheaf can be obtained in this way is
answered in the following:
Proposition 3.7 For any interaction presheaf E one has E ⊂ E• and E+ = E•.
Moreover E is a sheaf if and only if E = E•. It follows that any sheaf E can be
obtained as I where I is the interaction bundle E•.
Proof: The interaction form E• = (E•) is a sheaf by its construction, and
clearly E ⊂ E•, so that E+ ⊂ E•. Let U ∈ G0, let E ′ ⊃ E be a sheaf, and for
any a ∈ A let U(a) be the set of all open neighbourhoods of a. Writing out the
definitions and using inclusion, we have that
E•[U ] = ⋂
a∈U
⋃
V ∈U(a)
E [V ] ⊂ ⋂
a∈U
⋃
V ∈U(a)
E ′[V ].
Now we have (set theoretic equality):⋂
a∈U
⋃
V ∈U(a)
E ′[V ] = ⋃
(Vb)∈Πb∈UU(b)
⋂
b∈U
E ′[Vb],
where the union is over all possible collections V = (Vb)b∈A, with Vb ∈ U(b) for
all b ∈ A. Since E ′ is a sheaf, we have that ∩b∈UE ′[Vb] = E ′[∪b∈UVb] ⊂ E ′[U ]. It
follows that E•[U ] ⊂ E ′[U ]. Since E• ⊂ E ′ for all E ′ ⊃ E , we have E• ⊂ E+.
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Proposition 3.8 (i) For any interaction presheaf E : E• = (E+)•. (ii) For
presheaves E and F , E• = F• if and only if E+ = F+.
Let a ∈ A. Since E ⊂ E+ one has E•(a) ⊂ (E+)•(a). Let ϕ ∈ (E+)•(a). then
for some open neigborhood U of a, ϕ ∈ E+(U) and by Proposition 3.8 , there
exists some open cover (Ui)i∈I of U such that ϕ ∈ E(Ui) for all i ∈ I. Since
there exists i0 ∈ I such that a ∈ Ui0 we have that ϕ ∈ E•[a]. It follows that the
equality E+ = F+ implies E• = F•. Conversely if E• = F•, then by Proposition
3.7 E+ = E• = F• = F+
We remark that an interaction bundle I may be not equal to I•, that is for
some a ∈ A, I(a) 6= ∪U∈U(a)I[U ].
Example 3.9 Let f : A→ A be any map and for any a ∈ A, let I(a) ≡ U(a) be
the set of all neighborhoods of a. I can be viewed as an interaction bundle with
N = 1. In this case one has I(a) = ∪U∈U(a)I[U ] if and only if f is continuous at
a.
This justifies the following:
Definition 3.10 An interaction bundle I is said to be regular if I = I•.
If I is regular then or any preference profileRN ∈ Q(A)N , Stl(I, RN) = Stl(I, RN);
this is a consequence of Proposition 3.6.
Proposition 3.11 Let I be an interaction bundle. In order that I be regular it
is necessary and sufficient that I = E• for some presheaf E; moreover in this case
there exists a unique sheaf E such that I = E•, namely E = I.
Proof. The result follows immediately from Propositions 3.7 and 3.8.
One can summarrize the situation as follows: The operation • takes an inter-
action presheaf to some regular interaction bundle and its restriction to the set
of sheaves is injective, its inverse being the operation .
4 Stability of interaction presheaves
In this section, we introduce a combinatorial property of interaction presheaves
which is shown to be equivalent to stability. This extends the results of Abdou
and Keiding (2003) to the topological setup, given that the interaction presheaf
satisfies a mild continuity assumption and preferences are representable by con-
tinuous real functions.
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We need some more notation, extending the notion of range of an interaction
array as presented in Definition3.1: For ϕ ∈ P0(N,A) and i ∈ N the i-range of
ϕ is the set
Ri(ϕ) =
⋃
S:i∈S
ϕ(S).
Definition 4.1 Let E be an interaction presheaf. A cycle in E is family (Uk, ϕk)rk=1,
where Uk ∈ G, ϕk ∈ E [Uk], k = 1, . . . , r with the properties:
(i) ∪rk=1Uk = A,
(ii) if i ∈ N and ∅ 6= J ⊂ {1, . . . , r} then there exists k ∈ J such that
Uk ∩Ri(ϕj) = ∅ for all j ∈ J .
If E has no cycles, then E is said to be acyclic.
For proving equivalence of stability and acyclicity, we need the following lemma
which is a slight extension of a classical topological result about normal spaces.
Here and in the sequel, W denotes the closure of the set W .
Lemma 4.2 Let {Ui | i = 1, . . . , p} be a finite collection of open sets in a normal
topological space E. Then there are open sets Wi with the properties
(i) W i ⊂ Ui for i = 1, . . . , p,
(ii) ∪i∈JUi = E ⇒ ∪i∈JW i = E for all subsets J of {1, . . . , r}.
Proof: Let J ⊂ P({1, . . . , p}) be a collection of subsets of indices such that
for all J ∈ J , ∪i∈JUi = E. Choose any h ∈ {1, . . . , p} such that h ∈ I for some
J ∈ J , and let Jh = {J ∈ J | h ∈ J}. Then the sets U ch and
(
∩j∈J,j 6=hU cj
)
are
disjoint for each J ∈ Jh, so that
U ch ∩
[
∪J∈Jh ∩j∈J,j 6=h U cj
]
= ∅.
By normality of E, there are disjoint open sets V and Wh such that U
c
h ⊂ V and[
∪J∈Jh ∩j∈J,j 6=h U cj
]
⊂ Wh, ∩pi=2U ci ⊂ W1. Clearly W h ⊂ V c ⊂ Uh, and for each
J ∈ Jh, Wh contains ∪j∈J,j 6=hU cj , so that (Wh, (Uj)j∈J,j 6=h) is a covering of E.
Replacing the family (U1, . . . , Up) by (Wh, (Uj)j 6=h) and repeating the proce-
dure, we eventually get a family (W1, . . . ,Wp) with the desired properties.
A family (Wi)
p
i=1 with the properties stated in Lemma 4.2 is called a refinement
of (Ui)
p
i=1.
We shall also need an alternative formulation of the condition defining a cycle.
Lemma 4.3 Let E be an interaction sheaf. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) E has a cycle,
(2) there is a family (W k, ϕk)rk=1 with W
k ∈ G and ϕk ∈ E [W k], each k, such that
(i’) ∪nk=1W k = A,
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(ii’) for each i ∈ N there is a permutation (k1, . . . , kr) of (1, . . . , r) such that
for any j ∈ {1, . . . , r},[
W
k1 ∪ · · · ∪W kj
]
∩
[
Ri(ϕkj) ∪ · · · ∪Ri(ϕkr)
]
= ∅.
Proof: (1)⇒(2): Let (Uk, ϕk)rk=1 be a cycle in E , and let (W k)rk=1 be a refinement
of (Uk)rk=1 (Lemma 4.2). Let i ∈ N be arbitrary. By property (ii) in Definition
4.1 applied to J = {1, . . . , r}, we get the existence of k1 ∈ {1, . . . , r} such that
W
k1 and ∪rk=1Ri(ϕk) have empty intersection. Now, let 2 ≤ j ≤ r and assume
that indices k1, . . . , kj−1 have been constructed such that[
W
k1 ∪ · · · ∪W kj−1
]
∩
[
∪k∈{1,...,r}\{k1,...,kj−2}Ri(ϕk)
]
= ∅;
applying now property (ii) of Definition 4.1 with J = {1, . . . , r}\{k1, . . . , kj−1}
we get kj ∈ J such that[
W
k1 ∪ · · · ∪W kj
]
∩
[
∪k∈{1,...,r}\{k1,...,kj−1}Ri(ϕk)
]
= ∅;
Repeating the procedure r times yields a permutation (k1, . . . , kr) with the desired
properties.
(2)⇒(1): We check that (W k, ϕk) is a cycle in E , and it satisfies to show that (ii)
is fulfilled. Thus, let i ∈ N and let J be a nonempty subset of {1, . . . , r}. Let j0
be such that J ⊆ {kj0 , . . . , kr} where (k1, . . . , kr) is the permutation defined in
(ii’). Then each set Ri(ϕj)∩W kj0 for j ≥ j0, so that W kj0 does not intersect any
of the sets Ri(ϕj), for j ∈ J , and we have shown that (ii) is satisfied.
Theorem 4.4 A closed valued interaction presheaf E is stable if and only if it is
acyclic.
Proof. Assume that E is not stable. Then Stl(E , u) is empty for some continuous
profile u = (u1, . . . , un), that is for any a ∈ A there is Ua ∈ G and ϕa ∈ E [Ua]
such that such that ϕa(S) ⊆ P (a, S, ui) for all S ∈ P0(N), or expressed otherwise,
ui(a) < min{ui(b) | b ∈ Ri(ϕa)} for all i ∈ N such that Ri(ϕa) 6= ∅. Since
the ui are continuous, there exists an open neighbourhood W
a of a such that
sup{ui(c) | c ∈ W a} < min{ui(b) | b ∈ Ri(ϕa)} for all i ∈ N such that Ri(ϕa) 6= ∅.
Moreover, by the presheaf property, ϕa ∈ E [Ua ∩W a].
Since A is compact, there exist a1, . . . , ar such that the family (U
a1∩W a1 , . . . ,
Uar ∩W ar) is a covering of A. Put V k = Uak ∩W ak , ϕk = ϕak , k = 1, . . . , r. We
show that (V k, ϕk)rk=1 is a cycle.
Clearly, ∪rk=1V k = A; to check (ii) in Definition 4.1, let i ∈ N and ∅ 6= J ⊂
{1, . . . , r}. Let k ∈ J such that sup{ui(c) | c ∈ V k} = minj∈J sup{ui(c) | c ∈ V j}.
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We claim that V k ∩ Ri(ϕj) = ∅ for all j ∈ J . Indeed, this is trivially true if
Ri(ϕj) = ∅. If Ri(ϕj) 6= ∅, let a ∈ V k and b ∈ Ri(ϕj). We then have
ui(a) ≤ sup
c∈V k
ui(c) ≤ sup
c∈V j
ui(c) < ui(b),
which proves the claim and shows that (V k, ϕk)rk=1 is indeed a cycle.
Conversely let (Uk, ϕk)rk=1 be a cycle in E . We construct a profile (u1, . . . , un)
such that Stl(E , u) is empty. To begin, using Lemma 4.2 we choose an open
covering (W 1, . . . ,W r) of A such that W
k ⊂ Uk for k = 1, . . . , n.
Now, by Lemma 4.3 there is a permutation (k1, . . . , kr) of (1, . . . , r) such that
for any j ∈ {1, . . . , r},[
W
k1 ∪ · · · ∪W kj
]
∩
[
Ri(ϕkj) ∪ · · · ∪Ri(ϕkr)
]
= ∅.
We construct for each i ∈ N continuous function ui on A such that
ui(c) ≤ h− 1 for h ∈ {1, . . . , r} and c ∈ W kh ,
ui(b) ≥ h for b ∈ Ri(ϕkh)
This may be done as follows: Since A is a normal topological space, for any
h ∈ {1, . . . , r} there is a continuous function vh : A→ [0, 1] such that
vh(a) =
{
0 if a ∈ W k1 ∪ · · · ∪W kh ,
1 if a ∈ Ri(ϕkh) ∪ · · · ∪Ri(ϕkr).
The function ui =
∑r
h=1 v
h has the desired properties.
Consider now the profile (u1, . . . , un). If a ∈ W j and i ∈ N , then there exists
an index h (depending on i) such that kh = j. It follows that ui(a) ≤ h and
for any b ∈ Ri(ϕj), ui(b) ≥ h + 1, therefore Ri(ϕj) ⊂ P (a, ui) for each i, and
by the presheaf property we have P (W k, ·, u) ∈ E [W k], so that every a ∈ W k is
dominated.
Since (W1, . . . ,Wn) is a covering of A, the set of undominated alternatives at
the profile (u1, . . . , un) is empty.
Remark 4.5 Theorem 4.4 has been proved for the class of continuous preferences
preferences representable by continuous functions. It is easy to see, by a slight
modidication of the first part of the proof, that the same result holds for the
larger class of continuous preferences.
The characterization of stable interaction presheaves given in Theorem 4.4 gives
a purely combinatorial property of the power structure, which in principle may
be verified without recourse to preference profiles and notions of domination.
In order to exploit this fact in characterizing solvable game forms, we need to
investigate the relation between equilibria of the game form and the settlements
of its associated interaction forms and bundles. This is done in the following
section.
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5 Game form solvability and stability of inter-
action forms
We now return to the discussion of game forms; let G = (X1, · · · , Xn, A, g) be a
game form such that the strategy spaces Xi for i = 1, . . . , n as well as the outcome
space A are compact Hausdorff spaces, and where g is continuous and onto. In
Section 3, we introduced the associated β-interaction presheaf EGβ . We assume
that a confederationM⊂ P0(N) is given. We define the associated β-interaction
bundle I ≡ IG,Mβ by
Iβ[a] = {ϕ ∈ P0(N,A) | ∀xN ∈ g−1(a),
∃S ∈M, yS ∈ XS : g(yS, xSc) ∈ ϕ(S)} (5)
and the corresponding interaction sheaf (2). Similarly we define the α-interaction
bundle Iα ≡ IG,Mα and the corresponding interaction form Eα ≡ EG,Mα given by
(3). One has ϕ ∈ Eβ[U ] if and only if ϕc /∈ Eα[U ], where by definition ϕc(S) =
ϕ(S)c for all S ∈ P0(N). It is also clear that Eβ = (Iβ).
Remark 5.1 One advantage of our present model compared to that of Abdou
and Keiding (2003) is that restrictions on confederations as given in (1) reflect
faithfully the shift of power from one confederation to another in the game form
G. This is because we have:
EG,Mβ = (EG,P0(M)β )|M
where the second member is the projection of EG,P0(M)β onM. It follows that one
needs only to know EG,P0(M)β in order to deduce EG,Mβ for all confederations M.
The following result is straightforward but central for our characterization of
solvable game forms. It shows that the concept of β-interaction bundle is to the
M- equilibrium of the game (G,RN) what the β effectivity function is to the β-
core of that game :
Proposition 5.2 For any RN the set of M-equilibrium outcomes of (G,RN) is
equal to Stl(Iβ, RN).
Proof: Let a ∈ A be an M-equilibrium outcome of (G,RN). There exists an
M-equilibrium of (G,RN) xN ∈ X such that g(xN) = a and for all S ∈ M
and yS ∈ XS, g(yS, xSc) /∈ P (a, S,RN), and consequently, the interaction array
P (a, ·, RN) does not belong to Iβ[a]. If follows that a is not dominated in Iβ[a]
at RN , or equivalently a ∈ Stl(Eβ, RN).
Conversely, if a ∈ Stl(Iβ, RN) then the interaction array P (a, ·, RN) is not in
Iβ[a]. But then there must be some strategy array xN ∈ X with g(xN) = a such
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that g(yS, xSc) /∈ P (a, S,RN) for all S ∈M and all yS ∈ XS, showing that xN is
an M-equilibrium.
In order to apply the main result of Section 4, we need to work with interaction
presheafs or interaction bundles which are either closed- or open-valued. Since
however the relevant presheaf has a particular structure, we need a closer look
at the β-interaction presheaf as well as other, related, constructions. We recall
that the set of closed (resp. open) valued interaction arrays is denoted F0(N,A) (
resp. G0(N,A)). We define the presheaves Eβ (E˚β), Eα (E˚α) by restricting for each
U ∈ G0 to the interaction arrays which take only closed (open) sets as values.
Similarly, we introduce the interaction bundles Iβ, I˚β, Iα (I˚α)
Proposition 5.3 For any continuous RN , the set of M-equilibrium outcomes of
(G,RN) is equal to Stl(I˚β, RN).
We shall make use of a topology on the set of interaction arrays: For any
ψ ∈ P0(N,A), define the lower interval Iψ and the upper interval Jψ by :
Iψ = {ϕ ∈ F0(N,A) | ϕ ≤ ψ}
Jψ = {ϕ ∈ G0(N,A) | ψ ≤ ϕ}
The collection {Iψ | ψ ∈ G0(N,A)} is a basis for a topology on P0(N,A) which
is called the upper topology. F0(N,A) will be endowed with its topology as a
subspace of P0(N,A).
Lemma 5.4 For any a ∈ A and any U ∈ G0 we have:
(i) Iα(a) = {ϕ ∈ P0(N,A) | Iϕ ∩ Iα(a) 6= ∅}
(ii) Eα[U ] = {ϕ ∈ P0(N,A) | Iϕ ∩ Eα[U ] 6= ∅}
(iii) Iβ(a) = {ϕ ∈ P0(N,A) | Jϕ ⊂ I˚β(a)},
(iv) Eβ[U ] = {ϕ ∈ P0(N,A) | Jϕ ⊂ E˚β[U ]}
Proof: If Iϕ ∩ Iα(a) 6= ∅ then clearly ϕ ∈ Iα(a). Conversely, assume that
ϕ ∈ Iα(a), then there exists xN ∈ XN such that g(xN) = a and for all S ∈ M,
g(xSc , XS) ⊂ ϕ(S). Since the sets g(xSc , XS) for S ∈ P0(N) are closed, the
interaction array ψ defined by ψ(S) := g(xSc , XS), (S ∈ P0(N)) belongs to Iα(a)
and ψ ≤ ϕ. This proves assertion (i).The verification of the other assertions is
left to the reader.
Lemma 5.5 The correspondence Iα from A to F0(N,A) has closed graph in
A×F0(N,A).
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Proof: Let (a, ϕ) ∈ A×F0(N,A), let Va be the set of open neighbourhoods of
a, let Vϕ be the family Vϕ := (V : V ∈ G0(N,A), ϕ ≤ V ) and let V = Va × Vϕ.
Assume that (a, ϕ) belongs to the closure of the graph of Iα, that is for any
V ≡ (V1, V2) ∈ V there exist bV ∈ V1 and ψV ∈ IV2 ∩ Iα(bV ). By the definition of
Iα, there exists xVN ∈ XN such that g(xVN) = bV and for all S ∈M , g(xVSc , XS) ⊂
ψV (S) ⊂ V2(S).
The set V ordered by componentwise inclusion is a directed set. Since X is
compact, the net (xVN)V ∈V admits a convergent subnet, say (x
Vt
N )t∈T , where (T,≥)
is a directed set. Let xN be its limit; by continuity of g, g(xN) = a. We claim
that for all S ∈ M g(xSc , XS) ⊂ ϕ(S). Indeed, for any t ∈ T , continuity of g
implies that g(xSc , XS) ⊂ V2,t(S). Let V ∈ Vϕ. Since A is normal and due to the
subnet property, there exists some t ∈ T such that ϕ(S) ⊂ V2,t(S) ⊂ V2(S) for
all S ∈ S. Therefore g(xSc , XS) ⊂ V2(S). Since the last inclusion is true for all
V2 ∈ Vϕ, again by normality it follows that g(xSc , XS) ⊂ ϕ(S). We conclude that
ϕ ∈ Iα(a).
Lemma 5.6 I˚β is regular: (E˚β)• = I˚β.
Proof: Let a ∈ A. For any open neighbourhood U of a, (E˚)β[U ] ⊂ (I˚)β(a), so
that (E˚β)• ⊂ I˚β. Conversely, if ϕ ∈ (I˚)β(a) then ϕc /∈ Iα(a), where ϕc is the
interaction array defined by ϕc(S) = ϕ(S)c, all S. It follows from Lemma 5.5 that
there exist U ∈ G0, W ∈ G0(N,A) such that a ∈ U , ϕc ∈ IW and for all b ∈ U ,
Iα(b)∩ IW = ∅; in view of Lemma 5.4(i), W /∈ I˚α(b) or equivalently W c ∈ Iβ(b).
Since W c(S) ⊂ ϕ(S) for all S ∈ P0(N), we have ϕ ∈ (I˚)β[U ].
Example 5.7 Let pi : X1×X2 → X1×X2 the identity, A := X1×X2, pii(i = 1, 2)
the projections. Let M = {{1}}. For any (x1, x2) ∈ A, U ∈ G0, let
Iβ(x1, x2) = {B ⊂ A | x2 ∈ pi2(B)},
Eβ[U ] = {B ⊂ A | pi2(U) ⊂ pi2(B)},
then we have :
Iβ(x1, x2) = {ϕ | ϕ(1) ∈ Iβ(x1, x2)},
Eβ(U) = {ϕ | ϕ(1) ∈ Eβ[U ]}.
We remark that the set {(y1, x2)} ∈ Iβ(x1, x2) but unless x2 is isolated there is no
U ∈ U(x1,x2)) such that pi2(U) = {x2}. Therefore unless X2 is finite, E•β 6= Iβ. It
follows that unless X2 is finite Iβ and Iβ are not regular. Moreover let R : X2 →
X1 a map, then the graph of R, Graph(R) is an element of Eβ[A] but unless R
continuous, there is no a closed B ∈ Eβ[A] such that B ⊂ Graph(R). It follows
that there is no analog of Lemma 5.4(i) for Iβ.
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Lemma 5.8 For any a ∈ A and any U ∈ G0 we have:
(i) I˚β(a) = {V ∈ G0(N,A) | IV ∩ Iβ(a) 6= ∅}.
(ii) E˚β[U ] = {V ∈ G0(N,A) | IV ∩ Eβ[U ] 6= ∅},
Proof: By the definitions, if V ∈ G0(N,A) and IV ∩Iβ(a) 6= ∅, then V ∈ E˚β(a).
Conversely, if V ∈ I˚β(a) then V c /∈ Iα(a) so that by Lemma 5.5 there exists
W ∈ G0(N,A) such that V c ∈ IW and IW ∩ Iα(a) = ∅. In view of Lemma 5.4(i),
W /∈ I˚α(a) or equivalentlyW c ∈ Iβ(a). SinceW c ∈ IV we haveW c ∈ IW ∩Iβ(a).
This proves (i). The proof of the other assertion is left to the reader.
Lemma 5.9 For each continuous profile and let RN we have
Stl(Iβ, RN) = Stl(I˚β, RN) = Stl(E˚β, RN) = Stl(Iβ, RN) = Stl(Eβ, RN)
and this set equals the set of equilibrium outcomes of G at RN .
Proof: Let RN be a continuous profile. Put V (S) = P (a, S,RN) (S ∈ P0(N)).
Clearly V has open values. The first equality follows by Proposition 5.3. The
second equality follows from regularity of I˚β (Lemma 5.6). In view of Lemma
5.8 (i), Stl(I˚β, RN) = Stl(Iβ, RN). In view of Lemma 5.8 (ii) Stl(E˚β, RN) =
Stl(Eβ, RN).
Theorem 5.10 G is M-solvable if and only if Eβ (E˚β) is acyclic.
Proof. Applying Theorem 4.4 to Eβ, one has that M-solvabilty of G is equiv-
alent to acyclicity of the interaction sheaf Eβ. Moreover by Lemma 5.8(ii) any
cycle of E˚β gives rise to a cycle of Eβ.
Conversely given a cycle (Ck, ϕk)rk=1 of Eβ, applying Lemma 4.2 one may
replace the open cover (Ck)rk=1 of A by an open cover (U
k)rk=1 such that U
k ⊂ Ck
for k = 1, . . . , r. The array (U
k
, ϕk)rk=1 still verifies the combinatorial properties of
cycles. By a further application of Lemma 4.2 to the family ((U
k
)c, (ϕk(S))c, k =
1, · · · , r, S ∈ P0(N)) of open sets, one can replace (Uk, ϕk) by (W k, ψk) taking
open values such that U
k ⊂ W k and ϕk(S) ⊂ ψk(S) for all S ∈ P0(N), k =
1 · · · , r, thus getting a family (Uk, ψk)rk=1 which satifies conditions (i) and (ii) of
cycles. Since Uk ⊂ Ck one has ψk ∈ E˚β[Ck] ⊂ E˚β[Uk]. Thus (Uk, ψk)rk=1 is a cycle
in E˚β.
6 Interaction sheaves over convex domains
In the present section, we consider a special case which however turns up in
many applications, namely that where the domain A is a convex and compact
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subset of some Euclidean space Rd. Let C denotes the set of all convex and closed
subsets of A and C0(A,N) the set of all interaction arrays ϕ such that ϕ(S) ∈ C
for all S ∈ P0(N). Working with convex domains, it seems natural to restrict
preferences to all R ∈ Q(A) which are convex in the sense that for each a ∈ A,
the set P (a,R) is convex. Denoting this subset of Q(A) by QC(A), we say that an
interaction presheaf is c-stable if Stl(E , RN) 6= ∅ for each RN ∈ QC(A)N . Adding
a linear structure of the outcome space means that in some cases, the properties
of acyclicity and consequently of S-solvability may take another form due to the
restriction on the set of admissible preferences.
We then have to revise the results in Section 4 so as to take the convexity
of domain and preferences into consideration. For this, we must modify the
definition of a cycle given in Definition 4.1. We use the notation co(B) for the
convex hull of B ⊂ A.
Definition 6.1 Let E be an interaction sheaf on (N,A), A convex cycle in E is
a family (Uk, ϕk)rk=1 with U
k ∈ G0 and ϕk ∈ E [Uk], each k, such that
(i) ∪nk=1Uk = A,
(ii) if i ∈ N and ∅ 6= J ⊂ {1, . . . , r} then there exists k ∈ J such that
Uk ∩ co( ∪j∈J Ri(ϕj)) = ∅.
Lemma 4.3 in this context is still valid provided condition (ii’) takes a new
form, precisely
Lemma 6.2 Let E be an interaction sheaf. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) E has a cycle,
(2) there is a family (W k, ϕk)rk=1 with W
k ∈ G0 and ϕk ∈ E [W k], each k, such
that
(i’) ∪nk=1W k = A,
(ii’) for each i ∈ N there is a permutation (k1, . . . , kr) of (1, . . . , r) such that
for any j ∈ {1, . . . , r},[
W
k1 ∪ · · · ∪W kj
]
∩ co
([
Ri(ϕkj) ∪ · · · ∪Ri(ϕkr)
])
= ∅.
Let C0(A,N) be the set of all interaction arrays that are closed-and-convex
valued. We define EC[U ] = E [U ] ∩ C0(A,N).
Lemma 6.3 E is acyclic if and only if EC is. E is stable on QC if and only if EC
is.
We have the following counterpart of Theorem 4.4 in the context of convex cycles.
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Lemma 6.4 Let C1 ⊂ · · · ,⊂ Cp be an increasing sequence of compact and convex
sets of Rd such that 0 ∈ ◦C1 and d(Ck, Cck+1) > 0 for k = 1, . . . , p− 1. Then there
exists a continuous quasiconvex function v such that:
v(x) ≤ k ⇐⇒ x ∈ Ck, k = 1, . . . , p.
Proof. For any convex set containing 0, denote by JC(x) = inf{λ > 0 | x ∈ λC}
(= +∞ if the latter set is empty) and let ∂C denote the boundary of C. Define
v as follows:
v(x) = JC1(x) if x ∈ C1,
v(x) = k +
JCk(x)− 1
JCk(x)− JCk+1(x)
if x ∈ Ck+1 − Ck, k = 1, . . . , p− 1,
v(x) = p− 1 + JCp(x) if x ∈ Rd \ Cp
Then v is continuous on any point x ∈ Rd \ ∪pk=1∂Ck since the functions JCk are
continuous and JCk(x) − JCk+1(x) > 0 for x 6= 0. Moreover, if x ∈ ∂Ck, then
v(x) = k, and the continuity of v at x is easily verified.
We check the quasiconvexity of v: let x, y ∈ Rd, λ ∈ [0, 1], and let z =
(1− λ)x+ λy. Assume v(x) ≤ v(y); we distinguish 3 cases:
Case 1: y ∈ C1. We have x ∈ C1 so that by convexity of JC1 , v(z) ≤
max{v(x), v(y)}.
Case 2: y ∈ Ck+1 \Ck where 1 ≤ k ≤ p− 1. Let α = v(y)− k. If z ∈ Ck then
v(z) ≤ v(y). If z ∈ Ck+1 \ Ck then
(1− α) JCk(z) + αJCk+1(z)
≤ (1− α)[(1− λ)JCk(x) + λJCk(y)] + α[(1− λ)JCk+1(x) + λJCk+1(y)]
= (1− λ)[(1− α)JCk(x) + αJCk+1(x)] + λ[(1− α)JCk(y) + αJCk+1(y)]
≤ (1− λ).1 + λ.1
= 1.
Here the first inequality follows from convexity of JCk and JCk+1 and the fact
that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. When x ∈ Ck JCk(x) ≤ 2 and JCk+1(x) ≤ 1, so that (1 −
α)JCk(x) + αJCk+1(x) ≤ 1. When x ∈ Ck+1 \ Ck then v(x) − k ≤ α so that
again (1 − α)JCk(x) + αJCk+1(x) ≤ 1. In both cases v(y) − k = α so that
(1− α)JCk(y) + αJCk+1(y) = 1. This justifies the second inequality. We conclude
that v(z)− k ≤ α or equivalently v(z) ≤ v(y).
Case 3: y ∈ Rd − Cp. If z ∈ Cp then v(z) ≤ p ≤ v(y). If z ∈ Rd − Cp then
either x ∈ Rd − Cp and by convexity of JCp we have v(z) ≤ v(y) or x ∈ Cp then
JCp(x) ≤ 1 than again by convexity of JCp we have JCp(z) ≤ max 1, JCp(y) =
JCp(y) so that v(z) ≤ v(y).
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Now we have the ingredients for proving a counterpart of Theorem 4.4. Since
the method of proof is the same, once we have established the necessary ingredi-
ents in the form of Lemma 6.2-6.4 above, we shall the details and present only
an outline of the proof.
Theorem 6.5 Let E be an interaction presheaf. Then E is stable on QC(A) if
and only if E has no convex cycles.
Proof: (Outline) If E is not stable on QC(A) then existence of a convex cycle
follows the same steps of the general case. The only precision to add is that
empty intersections of condition 2(ii) of Lemma 4.3 extend to the convex hull
of the sets Ri(ϕkj) ∪ · · · ∪ Ri(ϕkr)), so that the condition 2(ii) of Lemma 6.2 is
satisfied.
Conversely, if a convex cycle exists, then for each player i, let (k1, . . . , kr)
be the permutation given in (2) of Lemma 6.2, and let Bij = co(R
i(ϕkj) ∪ · · · ∪
Ri(ϕkr)).
Remove empty sets Bik from the list if there are any, and let B
i
1, . . . , B
i
pi
be the remaining decreasing family of sets. Without loss of generality we may
assume that Bip has non-empty interior and d(B
i
k, (B
i
k−1)
c) > 0 for k = 2, . . . , p.
Then apply Lemma 6.4 to obtain a continuous quasiconvex function vi such that
vi(x) ≤ pi+1−k if and only if x ∈ Bik. The profile (u1, · · · , un), where ui = −vi(x),
i = 1, . . . , n, has an empty settlement set.
7 Concluding remarks
In the previous sections, we have introduced the concept of an interaction sheaf
and used it for the characterization of solvable game forms. This was done in
a topological framework. Equivalence between acyclicity and stability is proved
for the class of continuous preferences. In fact the Hausdorff assumption on the
compact set A provides a continuous class preferences rich enough to separate
closed sets by respecting some combinatorial property. The results are thus sim-
ilar to those of the discrete framework (e.g. Abdou and Keiding (2003)). If the
context requires restricted domains of preferences, the notion of acyclicity has to
be modified in accordance to that domain (see Kolpin (1991) for the effectivity
function case). As an interesting framework for this restriction we considered the
case of convex domains and convex continuous preferences.
The interaction sheaf represents conflicts in an intrinsic way since strategy sets
are not explicitely described. The interpretation of an interactive sheaf adopted
thoughout this paper is of the β-type. The power described is the upsetting power,
the dual of which would be the stabilizing, or forcing power. Consistently with
this interpretation the interaction sheaf of a game form as presented here contains
exactly the information needed to decide upon the question of solvability, and it
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cannot be excluded that future problems may need a further development of the
concepts used, so that we might not yet have reached the final form of describing
the power structure in a game form. However, the interaction sheaf seems to be
suitable for quite many problems, of which we have only touched upon a few.
Also, it should be observed that the construction may be applied not only to
strategic game forms but also to conflict situations which are presented in a less
simple form (indexed families of game forms, generalized game forms), pointing
to a more basic role of the interaction sheaf for analyzing conflict situations. They
may be either very simple, if they reflect the power the effectivity power where
each coalition acts separately, or more complex, where individuals act jointly
(Nash) and even more complex when all coalitions act jointly (strong Nash).
But since all those specific forms can be extracted by projection from a unique
form, the model allows for comparision of different contextual interactions and
the study of the degree of unstability when stability is not achieved. A closer
study of these possibilities will however be a matter of future research.
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